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Book Notes

ADDING FEMINISM TO LAW THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF JUSTICE
CLAIRE L'HEUREUX-DUBE. BY ELIZABETH SHEEHY, ED.
TORONTO: IRWIN LAW, 2004. Pp. v + 390.'
BY NANCY CLARIDGE

When Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dub6 stepped down from the
Supreme Court of Canada in July 2002, she left behind an enviable legacy
of enhancing women's legal and social equality rights in Canada through
her decisions in more than six hundred Charterof Rights cases. Adding
Feminism to Law is a collection of twenty papers that celebrates and
recounts L'Heureux-Dub6's contributions to the many areas of social
justice important to the advancement of women's rights.
As Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin writes in the foreward,
"[c]ompassion is at the core of Justice L'Heureux-Dub6's judicial
philosophy. She consistently approached the task of judging with
consideration for the hardships experienced by others."2 These qualities are
echoed in the writings of jurists, practitioners, academics, and front-line
workers.
Following the introductory materials, which include a tribute to
L'Heureux-Dub6, the collection of papers is broken into three sections that
focus on themes that stand out in her judgments. The first section, entitled
"The Enterprise of Judging," looks at L'Heureux-Dub6's approach to
judgment writing, highlighting an intellectual curiosity that is marked by a
respect for academic and grassroots contributions to the issues. In the
second section, "Shaping Substantive Law," the five authors examine
L'Heureux-Dub6's judgments in the area of family, human rights, taxation,
immigration, and criminal law, reflecting on the doctrinal shifts that were
the result of her judgments. Rounding out the collection is an examination
of L'Heureux-Dub6's commitment to invoking substantive equality, not
only to women, but to all marginalized groups. As the authors note in the
final section, "Committing to Equality," this commitment to substantive
over formal equality influenced emerging debates in Canada and equality
jurisprudence in other countries.
Among the book's contributors is newly appointed Supreme Court
of Canada Justice Rosalie Silberman Abella; Lee Lakeman, a collective
member at Vancouver Rape Relief and Women's Shelter, and author of the
2003 report Canada'sPromises to Keep: The Charterand Violence Against
I[Adding Feminism to Law]
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Women; Professors Mary Jane Mossman, Sheila McIntyre, Christine Boyle,
Shelley A.M. Gavigan, and Reg Graycar; and Ena Chadha, senior litigation
counsel at ARCH: A Legal Resource Centre for Persons with Disabilities.

RIGHTS FROM WRONGS: A SECULAR THEORYOF THE ORIGINS OF
RIGHTS. BY ALAN DERSHOWITZ. NEW YORK: BASIC BOOKS,
2004. Pp. ix + 261.
BY ANDREW SUNTER

In stark departure from the conventional, ever-expanding body of
thought on the ontology of human rights, Alan Dershowitz forwards a
rights theory that is not predicated on human nature, logic, law, or
religious faith. Dershowitz contends that human rights exist
notwithstanding the ontological status of God; that human nature is
inherently value-neutral and, therefore, not the source of rights; that the
a priori premises of logic, while cogent in a vacuum, enjoy little
practical consensus; and that positivist legal sources cannot, in
themselves, effectively sustain rights, since they can provide no
independent means of self-evaluation.
Dershowitz characterizes his approach as a bottom up dystopian
account of human rights. Dershowitz argues that rights are founded by
human experience-we gain human rights knowledge from the wrongs of
the past. For example, the right to religious freedom was fostered by
historical tragedies of religious intolerance and persecution, such as the
Holocaust, the Crusades, or the Spanish Inquisition. If human nature is at
all relevant to human rights, it is because the human species has an unique
ability to learn from its mistakes and avoid their repetition.
Dershowitz provides a refreshing departure from the moral
essentialism that seems to dominate human rights discourse. However,
Dershowitz-more renowned as a celebrity defence lawyer and left-leaning
political commentator than as a socio-political thinker-occasionally slips
into his own undefended version of essentialism. There are moments when
Rights from Wrongs reads less like a carefully reasoned theory than a
populist polemic. Dershowitz strives to make his argument accessible to a
broad audience, and while his non-technical prose is engaging, he has a
tendency towards deconstructing straw men rather than nuanced moral
philosophies. However, while Dershowitz's thesis is not altogether
persuasive, his central claim is an important reminder that effective rights
protection depends more on hard work than ideology.

